Abstract: It is commonplace in the debate on Germany's labor market problems to argue that low wage dispersion is a major reason for the high unemployment rate. This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment and residual wage dispersion for individuals with comparable attributes. In the conventional neoclassical point of view, wages are determined by the marginal product of the workers. Accordingly, increases in union minimum wages result in a decline of residual wage dispersion and higher unemployment. A competing view regards wage dispersion as the outcome of search frictions and the associated monopsony power of the firms. Accordingly, an increase in search frictions causes both higher unemployment and higher wage dispersion. The empirical analysis attempts to discriminate between the two hypotheses for West Germany analyzing the relationship between wage dispersion and both the level of unemployment as well as the transition rates between different labor market states. The findings are not completely consistent with either theory. However, as predicted by search theory, one robust result is that unemployment by cells is not negatively correlated with the within-cell wage dispersion.
Introduction
It is commonplace in the debate on Germany's labor market problems to argue that low wage dispersion as an indicator of low wage flexibility is a major reason for the high unemployment rate, see Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2005) and OECD (2006) . In international comparison, wage inequality in Germany is small and remained fairly stable until the late 1990s, see Prasad (2004) .
According to the Krugman (1994) hypothesis, the increase of wage inequality in the US and the increase of unemployment in Germany are two sides of the same coin, namely, the response to the pertinent skill bias in labor demand. Accordingly, wage rigidities caused by wage bargaining institutions (unions) have prevented wage inequality to rise in Germany thus resulting in higher unemployment. The rationale for this argument is that if wages are set above the marginal productivity of workers, firms do not employ some of the least productive workers.
Given the production technology and the skill bias, human capital theory explains wage differentials by concentrating on the role of individual, productivity-relevant traits (human capital). If individuals are paid as in a competitive human capital model, we expect that wage differentials stem only from differences in individual traits. Wages, however, differ between observationally equivalent workers. We call these differences residual wage dispersion and postulate that, if the human capital approach to wages is correct, the residual wage dispersion is explained by unobserved productivity differences. From an empirical point of view, one can control for a part of this residual variation if allowing for effects that come from specific firms ("high wage firms", see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) ) or from specific industries. This observation challenges the classical human capital model which assumes perfect competition and which allows neither for firm-specific differences nor for industry-specific effects, except for the case that the unobserved productivity differences are correlated with firms or specific industries.
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Search theory offers both an interesting alternative and complement to marginal productivity theory and human capital theory by focusing on search frictions as an explanation for wage differences among workers with identical marginal productivity. The basic idea of search theory is that under imperfect information, there is a match-specific rent because of opportunity costs of waiting for a better match. Then, the wage is not unique and does not necessarily correspond to the marginal product. Equally productive workers face different possible wages (or even a whole distribution) for which they could work. Under this perspective, the reason why firms pay different wages is that search frictions lend them monopsony power, which they can exploit to different degrees. On the one hand, there might be high-wage firms that have to pay high wages in order to assure their high employment. On the other hand, there might be low-wage firms that employ only a small number of employees since they lose them at a fast rate to their better paying competitors. Wage decompositions that try to identify the effect of search frictions on the basis of search equilibrium models attribute a considerable amount of the wage variation to search frictions.
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Search equilibrium models themselves predict a close association between wages and labor market transitions. When implementing these models empirically, a lot of identifying and non-testable assumptions typically have to be imposed on the data (see e.g. Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000) , or Ridder (1993, 1998) ).
We follow a slightly different approach here. Starting with the Krugman (1994) hypothesis that the relatively small wage dispersion in Europe might be the reason for the high unemployment in European countries, we distinguish two types of wage dispersion.
We distinguish wage dispersion between groups of individuals with the same observable (productivity relevant) characteristics ("between wage dispersion") and wage dispersion within such groups ("within wage dispersion") because, from a theoretical point of view, the reasons for the two might differ.
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Since in the empirical application, we are not able to control perfectly for differences in marginal productivity, we refer to residual wage dispersion as the empirical counterpart of within wage dispersion.
Regarding between wage dispersion, there is empirical evidence for Germany that wages are compressed across groups of different human capital endowments (as a proxy for marginal productivity) and that this compression has led to high unemployment, especially for the group of low-skilled (see among others Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006) ).
Although the view that the compressed wage structure in European countries has led to high unemployment seems to be the conventional wisdom among economists, it has not remained unchallenged since the trends in the employment to population ratios across skill groups and countries are quite similar (see e.g. Krueger and Pischke (1998) and Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999) ).
The focus of this paper is on within wage dispersion and its relationship to employment.
Here, we attempt to fill a research gap. Starting from search theory on the one hand and from productivity theory on the other hand, we discuss competing hypotheses with respect to the relationship between labor market transitions and within wage dispersion. On the one hand, classical theory based on marginal productivity determining factor prices predicts that wage dispersion is determined by individual heterogeneity.
Thus, empirically, within wage dispersion reflects unobserved productivity characteristics. When within wage dispersion decreases in response to institutional changes (such as a rise in union bargaining power or higher levels of public assistance) unemployment increases. On the other hand, search theory predicts an opposite relationship between the two variables. Here, a small amount of search frictions is responsible for the low within wage dispersion. At the same time, low search frictions lead to a low unemployment rate.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt in the literature to test between the different empirical implications of the two theoretical approaches.
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We use a large administrative labor market data set for West Germany, the IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe (IABS), which covers the time period 1975 to 1997 and which contains precise information on wages and the timing of changes in employment status. We define cells in which individuals are homogeneous with respect to age and education. Using this dataset, we first describe labor market transitions and wage changes following a jobto-job change, one of the key determinants in job search models. Then, we look at the wage structure and ask for the determinants of changes in the relative position in the wage distribution. Finally, we estimate how the rates at which labor market transitions take place and unemployment depend on the wage dispersion and vice versa. As an alternative to the approaches suggested in Ridder (1993, 1998) , we develop a simple nonparametric estimator for the unobserved job arrival rate and estimate its relation to the wage dispersion. Our results are more supportive for the search theoretic hypothesis than for the classical theory based on marginal productivity determining factor prices, although some implications of the former hypothesis are rejected. However, one remarkable and stable result in favor of a search theoretic view of the labor market persists: we find that there is no negative relationship between the unemployment rate and wage dispersion. This result, which is surprising for Germany, contradicts the hypothesis that labor unions compress wages within each cell, thereby causing high unemployment.
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, we discuss the two competing theories. Then, we describe the data and we present descriptive evidence on labor market transitions and the wage structure. As the main part of the empirical analysis, we use competing predictions of the two theories to test them against each other. The last section concludes and the appendix provides the precise definition of variables used in the empirical analysis.
Theoretical Background
From the neoclassical point of view, wages are equal to the marginal product of labor which is determined by the human capital endowment of a person and other productivity relevant characteristics after controlling for differences in physical capital usage.
In a competitive market, there is no room for pure firm (size) or interindustry wage differentials, when controlling for all productivity relevant individual characteristics, nor is there room for unemployment. However, when researchers can only control for observed characteristics, unexplained wage differentials might reflect differences in unobserved productivity relevant characteristics.
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Search and Matching theories provide an alternative explanation for within wage dispersion as the outcome of search frictions and monopsony power of employers. The textbook models view the competitive model as the limit case of search and matching models when frictions and monopsony power disappear (Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001) ).
However, because of productivity relevant unobserved characteristics we view the two models as nonnested alternatives in empirical work.
In addition to accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and frictions, the competitive textbook model has to be modified because of the importance of impact of unions on wage setting in Germany. In a standard wage bargaining model with right-tomanage assumption, wages still correspond to the marginal product of labor. Unions in Germany bargain with employers over a schedule of minimum wages for different types of jobs. The so-called "to-the-worker's-advantage" principle ("Günstigkeitsprinzip") allows firms to pay more but not less than the wage that is agreed upon by unions' and the employers' association. We do not model the objectives of labor unions explicitly in this paper, but simply assume that unions set binding minimum wages both in order to increase effective wages paid and to reduce wage inequality. Separate union contracts exist for different professional groups and different industries.
We expect that there is in general more than one binding minimum wage for individuals with identical observed human capital endowment since they might be employed in different industries or they might be grouped into a different professional group.
However, a smaller wage dispersion among individuals with identical observed human capital endowment can, ceteris paribus, be interpreted as originating from higher minimum wages set by labor unions.
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In the following, we discuss the heterogeneity hypothesis and the friction hypothesis as alternative theoretical rationales for wage inequality among observationally equivalent workers, which are not necessarily exclusive. We argue that the two approaches imply simple testable differences in their predictions for the descriptive relationship between wage inequality and unemployment, as well as transition rates between different labor market states in a world with sluggish adjustment. These theoretical predictions involve the relationship between endogenous outcomes assuming that the correlations in the data result from plausible economic assumptions about the data generating process.
Note that we do not attempt to estimate structural relationships.
Heterogeneity Hypothesis
Basic neoclassical theory assumes that markets are in a competitive equilibrium. If there is indeed a competitive market for labor, the same efficiency unit of labor will be paid the same wage, irrespectively of where it is employed. Human capital theory argues that the efficiency unit of labor is determined by the amount of (general) human capital that an individual has acquired. Wage dispersion results from differences in the human capital endowment. Wage dispersion among identical individuals is hard to explain from this point of view, unless one acknowledges unobserved productivity relevant characteristics.
Wage dispersion within groups can be explained by firms employing different capital stocks or technologies. But this situation should not persist in competitive markets. A second reason for wage dispersion within groups arises if there is specific human capital.
In this case, even if we are able to measure true human capital 7 endowment, the wage is not uniquely determined by the amount of human capital but can be negotiated between the firm and the worker, since rents exist due to the specific capital not being of use in other firms (see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001), pp. 193ff.) .
Further important sources of residual wage dispersion relate to measurement issues.
First, we might not be able to measure human capital correctly because of data re-6 See Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005) for evidence that unions compress wages in Germany. Obviously, this raises the question why labor unions set wages too high. One possible reason is that at least some of the low wage employees gain from the minimum wage if they are still employed and paid a higher wage rate. E.g. Pfeiffer (2003) discusses further reasons for compressed wages within the productivity framework in the German context. 7 We define human capital as all individual traits which influence the (marginal) productivity of an individual.
strictions. Second, there might be unmeasurable qualities of individuals, like ability, that affect marginal productivity and that are (partially) observed by the employer.
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Suppose, now, that a union and an employer association agree upon increasing the minimum wage for a group of observationally equivalent workers. If the minimum wage is binding then some employees will lose their job. The reason is, that residual wage dispersion is explained by unobserved productivity differences and that the minimum wage truncates the distribution of the marginal productivities at some point. This makes some jobs unprofitable who were previously profitable.
Next, we formalize these ideas by means of a simple stylized model. Assume a group of (to the econometrician) observationally equivalent workers. Worker types are indexed by productivity p ∈ [0, 1] and there exists a continuum of worker types uniformly distributed on this interval. As a normalization, there is a labor supply of one for each worker type with productivity p. Therefore, the total labor force (as the integral across p) is also normalized to equal one. workers of type p are assigned to one firm (job) and there is no substitution across firms. Each firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function pl α p with l p , labor of productivity p, as the only input, where 0 < α < 1 and 0 ≤ l p ≤ 1. A firm employing workers of productivity p has real profits
where w p is the wage paid to workers with productivity p.
In competitive equilibrium, there is no unemployment, i.e. l p = 1, and workers are paid according to their average product w p = p, because profits are zero due to free entry of firms. The distribution of wages follows the distribution of productivities. Now, we introduce a minimum wage w min , with 0 ≤ w min < 1, such that w p can not fall below w min . Then, we have two cases
again assuming zero profits for each firm. We obtain employment l p in case (ii) by setting π p = 0 and solving for l p . Now, total employment is given by
We have ∂L/∂w min = −1/(2 − α) < 0, i.e. employment falls in response to an increase in the minimum wage. The number of workers earning the minimum wage is
] w min which is growing in w min , i.e. with an increase in the minimum wage total employment falls, the number of workers receiving the minimum wage increases, and their share in employment increases even more strongly.
Next, we analyze the effect of an increase in the minimum wage on the observed wage distribution. The average wage observed,w, is given after some calculations bȳ
The response of the average wagew to an increase in the minimum wage w min is
i.e. the average wage increases in response to an increase in the minimum wage. This follows because the numerator in the right-hand-side expression in equation (4) Below, we show that quantile differences in the observed wage distribution are nonincreasing in response to an increase of the minimum wage and are decreasing in the upper part of the wage distribution. From this result, it follows that every dispersion measure is nonincreasing with an increase in the minimum wage, and in particular the variance of wages falls. From the formal argument below, it also follows that an increase of the minimum wage compresses the wage distribution more strongly in the lower part of the distribution compared to the upper part.
To show the result for quantile differences, consider the θ 0 -and θ 1 -quantiles q θ 0 (w) and q θ 1 (w) with θ 0 , θ 1 ∈ [0, 1] and θ 0 < θ 1 . To analyze the effect of an increase in the minimum wage, we have to distinguish three cases. The first case is w min < q θ 0 (w) < q θ 1 (w). The two quantiles are given by q θ (w) = 1 − L(1 − θ) for θ = θ 0 , θ 1 because employment at the respective productivity levels is equal to one. Thus,
because of the result in the next line after equation (2). The second case is w min = q θ 0 (w) < q θ 1 (w).
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Then,
because |∂L/∂w min | < 1. The third case is w min = q θ 0 (w) = q θ 1 (w) where the quantile difference is zero and does not change with an increase in w min .
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Analogous to the change in the minimum wage, one can easily analyze the effect of a change in the distribution of productivities p. If productivities of all workers increase by the same absolute amount, the effect on employment and on wage dispersion is analogous to a decline in the minimum wage, i.e. both employment and wage dispersion increase. However, the average wagew increases, albeit by a smaller amount than the uniform increase in p because of the higher employment level in the lower part of the productivity distribution. If there is a mean-preserving spread in the productivity distribution, then employment falls and the average wage increases. The effect on wage dispersion is ambiguous. Only in the upper part of the wage distribution it is clear that quantile differences increase.
In the cells in our data, different minimum wages (contract wages) apply in different industries and different jobs even though the workers are observationally equivalent for us. Therefore, we do not observe a spike in the data at the minimum wage. We interpret the residual wage dispersion observed in one cell as a mixture of wage distributions derived from our stylized model. Since contract wages in Germany tend to grow in parallel fashion from year to year, the results of our stylized model are likely to apply to our data situation.
Next, we sketch how to consider the dynamics of the labor market as reflected by transition rates between different labor market states. Since markets need time to adjust to a new equilibrium, it is realistic to assume that unemployment does not react immediately to a change of the binding minimum wage. This result can be obtained from the dynamic theory of labor demand with convex adjustment costs (Hamermesh (1993) ) combined with an exogenous job destruction. When minimum wages compress the wage distribution exogenously, then the reaction in employment responds to the change in the minimum wage and the latter is reflected in the decline of wage dispersion.
In addition we argue, that the wage dispersion responds immediately to an increase in the minimum wage (to an increase in union wages) but the employment reaction is delayed because of adjustment costs (e.g. due to delayed capital adjustment, training costs for newly hired workers, or institutional reasons such as employment protection). We refrain from introducing dynamics into our stylized model. We expect that, as a reaction to an increase of a binding minimum wage, more labor contracts will end over time. Analogously, we observe over time fewer transitions from unemployment to employment since the potential match between employee and employer will become less profitable.
We assume that the variation in the data stems from two sources, namely (partly) exogenous changes in the binding minimum wages and uniform shocks to the distribution of marginal productivity within groups of workers. As indicated above, the implications of changes in the dispersion of productivities are ambiguous. The following Heterogeneity Hypothesis summarizes the empirical implications on the implied relationship between residual wage dispersion and labor market transition rates.
Heterogeneity Hypothesis: Consider a cell of observationally equivalent workers. When the residual wage dispersion decreases (because of an increase in the minimum wage or a uniform downward shift of the distribution of marginal productivities), then the cell-specific unemployment rate increases, the transition rate from unemployment to employment declines, and the transition rate from employment to unemployment increases. Labor market transition rates, and therefore unemployment, react with a lag because of adjustment costs (dynamic labor demand). There is no clear relationship between job-to-job changes and wage dispersion. Transition rates do not affect future wage dispersion.
Friction Hypothesis
The discussion so far has assumed that individuals with a similar observed human capital endowment are still heterogeneous with respect to their marginal productivity and that they are paid according to it. This section is based on a different view. After having controlled for the educational level and for experience, assume that indeed individuals are identical with respect to their marginal productivity or, at least, that the employer cannot observe the differences. In addition, we drop the assumption that the individual is perfectly informed about his/her market wage. There is imperfect information for both sides of the labor market, since there are costs for the employers to search for new employees and for the employees to find employers. Let these costs only consist in the opportunity cost of the time it takes to find a match. Then, given that an employer and an employee have come together, there is a rent to be divided between them because it is costly for both not to agree upon a contract (a matchspecific rent). For the employer the fallback option consists in a vacancy that does not produce anything until the next meeting with an employee takes place (zero profit), while, as demonstrated in the seminal paper by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) , in equilibrium every match generates positive profits. For the employee, the opportunity cost consists of the difference between the wage and the reservation wage which reflects his optimal decision when to accept a wage offer.
Given the existence of match-specific rents, the wage for identical individuals is not uniquely defined. From economic theory, it is not clear how this rent is shared between the parties; there is a whole range of possible mechanisms which define the rent sharing, depending on what one assumes to be a plausible assumption. In this paper, following Burdett and Mortensen (1998) , we assume that the wage is set by the employer, as a "take it or leave it" offer for the employee.
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In equilibrium it pays for the ex ante identical firms to choose different strategies and to offer different wages. The reason for this is that in equilibrium large and small firms coexist. Large firms will pay high wages in order to attract many individuals working at competing firms and to lose only little staff to (the few better-paying) competitors. The high employment comes at the cost of small profits per employee. Firms that pay low wages, on the contrary, will have high profits per employee but only a small staff, since they lose their employees at a high rate to their better paying large competitors. This implies that for the employee it is not clear, ex ante, at which wage rate he will initially be employed. In addition, while being employed he moves to better paying jobs over time since he receives offers from other firms. For this setup, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that the individual faces a continuous distribution of wages at which he could be employed.
The decision of an individual searching for a job is then whether to accept a certain wage offer or to wait for the next one. To do this he compares the value of accepting the job with the value of remaining unemployed (in the sense of expected income). If indeed, as suggested here, the equilibrium result is wage dispersion among identical individuals, the residual wage dispersion we observe in the data does not necessarily reflect differences in productivity but instead it is a result of search frictions.
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But search frictions themselves also affect the equilibrium unemployment rate, thus predicting that higher search frictions lead to higher wage dispersion and to higher (involuntary) unemployment. Below, we will give a formal derivation of these arguments.
Consider a labor market where infinitely many individuals (with measure N ) are either employed or unemployed. If employed, they produce p per time unit, which lies above the common reservation wage. If unemployed, they obtain z as net unemployment benefit. The individuals maximize the present value of their expected life income while discounting the future with discount rate r and without being able to choose the number of hours worked. On the other market side, there is an infinite number of firms (with measure 1) which maximize expected profits by choosing ex-ante one single wage that they will pay to their staff.
14 Unemployed individuals receive independent wage offers from the stationary wage offer distribution H(w) at an exogenous rate λ (job offer rate), whereas when employed they receive independent offers from the same distribution at rate λ L .
15
Finally, individuals working can lose their jobs for exogenous reasons at rate δ (job destruction rate). Since we assume that the number of job offers an individual receives in a specific time interval is Poisson-distributed, there cannot be two offers at the same time. The optimal strategy for the individual is characterized by a reservation wage w R , where all offers above w R are accepted and all offers below are rejected. To calculate the reservation wage, we equate the value equations for unemployment and employment and solve for the wage (for details, see the survey Garloff (2003) , equation (7) and appendix 6.1, as well as the literature cited there). After some simplifications, we obtain
where w o represents the maximum of the wage offer distribution. Intuitively, the reservation wage is the higher, the higher unemployment benefits are and the better the job perspectives off-the-job are as compared to on-the-job. The term under the integral represents the average surplus of the value of an employment above w R compared to the value of unemployment. The reservation wage characterizes the behavior of the unemployed. The behavior of employed persons is characterized by the fact that they change jobs if they receive a job offer above their current wage (see Mortensen and Neumann (1988) ). Now, the behavior of firms has to be discussed (see Garloff (2003) for details). Firms maximize profits given by the profit per employee (p − w), where p denotes the output per worker and the price of output is normalized to 1, times the (expected) number of employees (l(w)). In order to deduce the equilibrium number of employees, consider the dynamics for the firms that pay wages above w. They gain new employees from the pool of unemployed and from the pool of firms that pay wages below w, while they lose employees only through exogenous shocks. From these dynamics we can derive both the distribution of paid wages in a cross section of workers (G(w)) and the equilibrium amount of workers employed in a firm paying a wage w (l(w)). Since firms that pay higher wages are able to attract workers from competing firms, l(w) is increasing in w.
For firms, it does not pay off to offer wages below w R since workers will never accept and so these firms will have no staff. In equilibrium, firms pay wages above w R . To solve the model for the equilibrium wage offer distribution, the profits of enterprises at the reservation wage (which can be shown to be paid in any case, see Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000) ) are set equal to the profits for some other point in the support of the wage offer distribution. This yields the equilibrium distribution of wage offers across firms.
This equilibrium exhibits the following properties: First, identical (≡ equally productive) individuals are offered and earn different wages, which are strictly below the marginal productivity p if there are frictions.
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Second, the amount of frictions determines the unemployment rate ur = δ/(δ + λ). Now, assume that there is a (binding) minimum wage w min constituting the lower bound of the wage (offer) distribution. Since the upper part of the wage distribution depends on the lower bound of the distribution (see footnote 16), it follows that the whole distribution changes in response to the introduction of the minimum wage. In the new equilibrium, firms still make identical profits, but the level of profits is lower, while employment remains the same.
Regarding the Krugman hypothesis, note that equilibrium unemployment does not change in response to changes of the minimum wage as long as the latter does not 16 This can be seen from the upper bound of the wage offer distribution, which is given by
exceed the marginal productivity of the individuals affected, 17 because every match still yields a positive contribution to firms profits.
The variance of the distribution of paid wages depends on two determinants: The first determinant is the job offer rate for employed job seekers. Intuitively, the more often individuals are able to change jobs because of wage differences, the more difficult it is for firms to pay low wages since then they quickly lose their staff. The second determinant of the variance of wages is the job destruction rate. The higher this rate, the more frequently employees lose their jobs and become unemployed. Hence, the search friction is higher and the variance of the wage distribution is larger. This is because the tradeoff for low-wage firms improves through higher inflows from unemployment.
In what follows, we formalize the determinants of the variance of the distribution of paid wages (G(w)). From equation (8) and from the equations characterizing the flow equilibria, we can calculate the variance of the distribution of paid wages for identical individuals. It is given by (see Van den Berg and Ridder (1993) , p. 48ff.)
where η = δ δ+λ L is a friction indicator.
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Simple comparative static calculations reveal that the variance is increasing with δ and decreasing with λ L if η < 1/3. Thus, only if the job offer rate on-the-job is more than twice the job destruction rate, the above arguments are correct and the effect of η on the variance is unambiguously positive. We assume that this condition is satisfied thus allowing us to test empirically between the two theoretical approaches.
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Next, we turn to discussing the dynamics of the model. The model assumes that the friction parameters are exogenously given and they determine wage dispersion and employment. If there is a change in the friction parameters and if this change is exogenous in the sense that this change does not affect the wage dispersion directly, then there is likely to be inertia in the adjustment of the wage setting behavior to find the new equilibrium wage distribution. Then, a regressing wage dispersion on the 17 Obviously, the same is true for the classical model. But, in the classical framework, if a minimum wage is binding, there are always people whose marginal productivity is below this minimum wage, since everybody is paid its marginal productivity. So, the crucial difference is that, under the frictional point of view, people are not paid their marginal productivity, and therefore a binding minimum wage does not necessarily mean higher unemployment.
18 η is the proportion of jobs that end for exogenous reasons among the sum of such job destructions and offers for a job-to-job change. The higher this share, the more unfavorable is the situation for the employees, since jobs end quite fast for exogenous reasons before the individuals can climb the wage ladder.
19 Empirically, the rates mostly fulfill this condition. In 8 out of 510 cases (less than 2%), however, the conditions is not satisfied. friction parameters can describe this delayed adjustment along the line of equilibrium search theory.
We summarize the empirical implications as the Friction Hypothesis which clarifies the differences to the heterogeneity hypothesis in the marginal productivity theory.
Friction Hypothesis: If the job offer rate on-the-job increases or the job destruction rate declines, then the residual wage dispersion decreases and the cell-specific unemployment rate declines. There is no clear relationship between the job offer rate off-the-job and wage dispersion, but unemployment decreases with an increase in the job offer rate off-the-job. Wage dispersion itself does not affect transition rates. A minimum wage is not affecting the unemployment rate and the transition rates between unemployment and employment.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample (IABS), a large administrative data set for Germany for the time period 1975 to 1997, see Bender, Haas, and Kloose (2000) . The IABS contains information from two sources. The first source is the employment statistic based on the integrated notification procedure for health insurance, social security, and unemployment insurance. This way, employers are required to report employment under the social security system which covers about 80% of all employees. Civil servants, self-employed, helping family, students, and employees earning less than a certain low threshold income are not covered by the system. The second source for the IABS are the transfer payments to the unemployed.
The two sources are merged together for a one percent random sample of employees from the social security records. Therefore, by construction, the dataset is representative regarding employment covered by the social security system but not regarding unemployment. The information on timing (daily!) of being in one labor market state (spells) and on the gross daily wage (rounded to DM) are exact, except for the wage being censored at the upper social security threshold. Typical panel data problems like panel mortality or recollection error do not arise. In addition, the dataset is big (about 8 millions observations) and representative for all persons who have been employed at least once in a job that is part of the compulsory notifying procedure during the observed 23 years (more than the 80% in a cross section of workers 20 ). In the dataset, we can observe three labor market states: employed, recipient of transfer payments (i.e. unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance and income maintenance 20 The share is even higher for the full-time employed used in our empirical analysis.
during participation in training programs), and being out of sample.
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Unfortunately, none of the two last categories corresponds exactly to the economic concept of unemployment. On the one hand, the second state is likely to approximate unemployment better than the third one, since every person being recipient of transfer payments is indeed unemployed from an administrative point of view.
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On the other hand, there are individuals who are registered unemployed and/or who are actively searching for employment but who are not entitled to receive transfer payments. During this time, these individuals are not recorded in the IABS. Thus, they cannot be distinguished from self-employed, civil servants, individuals being out of labor force, and others who are at least once employed in a recorded job during the observation period.
We calculate transition rates between the three states. Transitions from employment to receiving transfer payments are interpreted as transitions to unemployment, 23 since already a short employment spell results in a renewal of benefit entitlement. E.g. after an employment spell of twelve months, the benefit entitlement period is six months. In contrast, transitions from unemployment into employment are not that easily approximated by transitions from receiving transfer payments to employment. Long-term unemployed, whose benefits are exhausted, might find a job, and there might be people shifting from the state receiving transfer payments to the state out of sample by becoming a civil servant or by becoming self-employed. Therefore, in the empirical section, we use different definitions of unemployment to investigate the robustness of the results. The job-to-job (employer-to-employer) transition rate does not suffer from such problems, because establishments are easily and uniquely identifiable in the data. However, recognize that, in light of the friction hypothesis, the relevant variable is the job arrival rate and not the actual job changing rate. However, we do not observe job offers that are turned down. Therefore in the empirical analysis, we use different proxies of the job-offer-rate as well, where one definition is based on the job-to-job transition rate only, and the other uses information on the wage position before the change along with the changing rate, thereby assuming that individuals accept all job offers that yield wages above their own wage and turn down all others.
For our empirical analysis, the wage observation used precedes the transition information in calendar time. Wages for one year are sampled at the beginning of the year.
Labor market transitions are measured between January 1 of the current year and 21 Furthermore, one could distinguish out of sample between two recorded spells in the data (narrow definition) versus out of sample including also before the first or after the last spell in the data (broad definition). In most cases, we use the narrow definition.
22 With the exception of participants in a training program. We basically view them as being unemployed since the goal of the program is to improve the reemployment chances in the future. 23 The largest group of workers not contained in the dataset are civil servants who are typically tenured (≡ no risk of unemployment).
January 1 next year.
The data used involves only full-time working men in West Germany who are 25 to and 54 years old. This sample is grouped into cells by age, education, and year. We define three education groups: The first category corresponds to persons who have neither a completed vocational training nor a university degree. The second category are people who have finished a vocational training but have no university degree. The third group corresponds to persons who have a university degree or a degree from a university of the applied sciences ("Fachhochschule").
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We also group the individuals by their age in ten three-years-intervals (25-27, 28-30, etc.) to proxy for potential experience. For the descriptive analysis, we use the cells for all 22 years . For the explicit empirical test of the two hypotheses, we restrict ourselves to the 17 years 1980-1997, since there are concerns that the transition rates cannot be estimated consistently for the seventies (see Bender, Haas, and Kloose (2000) ). Annual transition rates are based on the labor market state on January 1st of each year. The within wage dispersion is calculated for the cross section of workers in each age-education cell for the 22 (17) years. When wages are censored from above, we replace the censored value by the predicted value from a Tobit regression (run separately for every age-education cell in every year) assuming that log-wages are normally distributed in a cell.
Empirical Analysis
We first present descriptive evidence on labor market transitions and the wage structure. Then, we scrutinize the testable predictions of the heterogeneity hypothesis and the friction hypothesis.
Descriptive Evidence
First, we calculate the transition rates between the three labor market states and the rate of job-to-job changes for each of the thirty cells by year. Further detailed results can be found in our companion paper Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) .
Several testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between theses rates and age or education are plausible. Since search efficiency increases and mobility costs decrease presumably with higher education, the friction hypothesis implies that the job changing rate increases with higher education. Since individuals sort themselves in better paying 24 Notice that the education information in the IABS-dataset is not always consistent over time so that we corrected the education information based on the simple rule that a finished degree cannot be lost. E-EO: job-to-job changes for different age-education-groups; E-E: Probability of remaining employed E-ES: Probability of remaining in the same job; BR-E: Receiving transfer payments to employment BR-BR: Probability of remaining recipient of transfer payments; OOS-E: Out of sample to Employment OOS-OOS: Probability of remaining out of sample jobs as time progresses, we expect that job changing rates decrease with age. As far as the job finding rate is concerned, one might argue that people who are older have higher reservation wages because they had higher wages before (see e.g. Christensen (2003) ).
Again, with higher education the knowledge about job opportunities improves.
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According to the heterogeneity hypothesis, it is not clear whether job changes increase with higher education. For older workers, we expect less job changes due to a higher level of specific human capital at risk. The same holds true for the transitions to unemployment because their high dismissal protection (see Franz (2006) , chapter 7.2) makes firing them more unlikely. Based on the heterogeneity hypothesis, we expect the reemployment probability for those who receive transfer payments to decrease in age for institutional reasons because the length of benefit entitlement increases in age. Table 1 summarizes the transitions between the three states and their variation with age and education using simple OLS-regressions. The reference category consists of employees with lower education, aged 25-27. Job changes are more frequent for higher educated individuals than for lower educated individuals and they occur less frequently as individuals get older.
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Likewise, the probability of remaining employed increases with higher education and with age. Similar to other studies (see e.g. Lauer (2003)), we observe the highest job stability for individuals with a vocational training degree, but not for university graduates. The probability of staying at the same job decreases with higher education and increases with age. The probability for returning from receiving transfer payments to employment increases with the education level and decreases with age, while likewise the probability of remaining transfer recipient increases with age and decreases with higher education. Finally, once out of the sample, individuals return more often to employment when they hold a vocational training degree and more rarely as university graduate. It first decreases with age but then shows a minimum at the age of 40 to 45. Finally, individuals with a vocational degree stay less often out of sample while university graduates stay more often out of sample.
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The probability of remaining out of sample increases with age and shows a maximum in the 40s.
We conclude that most findings discussed so far are consistent with both hypotheses of the labor market, as put forward above, although the heterogeneity hypothesis does not cover job-to-job transitions. Since job-to-job changes are a crucial aspect in equilibrium search theory, we explore them in more detail. We defined job-to-job 25 A related argument of why the job finding rate might be higher for high-skilled individuals is given in Moen (1999) . Here the basic idea is that there might be several job applicants for one vacancy at a time and that the person with the highest skill will always get the job.
26 As a quantitative example, having a university degree as compared to having no degree at all is associated with a 3.4% higher rate of job change. 27 Reasons might be that a university degree often is a prerequisite for becoming civil servant and that university graduates more often become self-employed.
changes as a change of the employer with an intervening out of sample spell lasting not longer than 15 days.
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Furthermore, we consider wages before and after job change, distinguish winners and losers, and calculate the mean gain or loss from the job-to-job change (detailed results are available upon request, see also our companion paper Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) ). On average, winners earn about 25% more, while losers still earn around 15% less. Almost two thirds have an effective gain from changing jobs while more than 25% lose. The high skilled workers show higher average wage increases, even though the share of winners is smaller. The relative wage gain decreases with age, but at the same time the share of losers decreases as well. Overall, the high gains and the high share of winners point to the central role of wage changes in understanding job-to-job changes. There is also a remarkable share of persons with losses. This result is difficult to reconcile with search theory, unless one acknowledges that workers expecting displacement start searching early and are willing to accept wage cuts to avoid unemployment. Still, the decreasing gains from such changes with age can be understood as sorting processes into higher paying jobs. The fact that relative losses do not increase with age is difficult to reconcile with the notion that specific capital should be more important at a higher age as a proxy for tenure and experience. As far as the relationship between education and shares of winners/losers as well as relative gains or losses are concerned, the hypotheses discussed above do not allow to completely rationalize our findings.
The relationship between transitions and wages
We now turn to a test whether residual wage dispersion is related to heterogeneity or to labor market frictions. We start by restating the central ideas of both hypotheses.
On the one hand, if wages are basically determined by residual heterogeneity under the heterogeneity hypothesis, we expect that lower wage dispersion indicates stronger union influence, which results in higher unemployment, higher entry rates into unemployment, and lower exit rates out of unemployment. On the other hand, the friction hypothesis postulates that wages in one cell are determined by the amount of search frictions. If wage dispersion is low, then both search frictions and unemployment are low as well.
The direct effect of search frictions works via the job destruction rate which is positively related with wage dispersion and unemployment. An indirect effect originates from the fact that the job offer rate on-the-job (which negatively affects wage dispersion) and off-the-job (which negatively affects unemployment) are likely to be positively correlated.
Regarding the heterogeneity hypothesis, the relevant variables can be directly measured. We will regress transition rates and the unemployment rates on our measure of wage dispersion. For the friction hypothesis, the relevant variables are not observable. First, we do not observe the job offer rate on-the-job but only the job-to-job transition rate. Under the assumptions of the search model, individuals change jobs if the wage offer exceeds the current wage (see Mortensen and Neumann (1988) ), i.e. the probability of changing a job is given by the product of the job arrival rate and the probability that the wage offer exceeds the current wage, i.e. JCR = λ L (1 − H(w) ).
We rely on this definition to estimate the job offer rate by
where JC i is a dummy variable for a job-to-job change and N is the total number of employees in a cell. The position in the wage offer distribution H t (w i,t ) is estimated by identifying the quantile position of the individuals wage before the job change in the distribution of all newly started jobs in the relevant year. Equation (10) implies that the contributions to the estimated job offer rate can be quite substantial (up to infinity), if an employee in the upper part of the wage distribution experiences a job-to-job change. To avoid very high contributions to the estimated λ, we censor all wages above the 95th percentile to the 95th percentile, thus precluding that a job to job change in the upper tail of the wage distribution contributes more than 20 times the contribution of an individual at the lower bound of the wage distribution.
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Recognize however that wage cuts occur in more than 25% of all job-to-job transitions, thus pointing to the fact that a part of the job offers is accepted although they result in a lower wage and opening the possibility that job offers are rejected although they would pay more. This questions our measure of the job offer rate. For this reason, we calculate the job changing rate as a robustness measure, assuming that individuals accept every job offer, whereas the above measure suggests that people accept job offers only when they result in a higher wage.
29 Measurement error is a serious concern in the upper part of the offer wage distribution which is unlikely to be identified from data on newly starting jobs. In some cells, the wage offer distribution is relatively far away from the observed wage distribution and the support of the two wage distributions often does not coincide. Furthermore, in some cells, we do not observe many job-to-job transitions. These problems further motivate to censor wages in the upper part of the distribution.
The second variable which determines the wage dispersion is the job destruction rate. Again, it is not possible to distinguish between voluntary quits and job destructions due to exogenous reasons.
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However, as often done in the literature, the entry rate into unemployment is used to proxy exogenous job destruction (see e.g. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) ). As a robustness check, we use different definitions when calculating the entry rate into unemployment, see appendix.
As measure of wage dispersion, we use the interquantile range (iqr) between the eighth and the second decile of log wages. This is a more robust measure compared to the sample variance (or its Tobit estimate) in a cell because of the censoring in the wage data. For medium and low skilled worker, iqr is not affected by censoring for the vast majority of cells. However, for high skilled workers censoring is quite prevalent at the eighth decile and, therefore, we omit high skilled worker from the analysis.
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According to the heterogeneity hypothesis, a smaller iqr reflects a stronger wage compression by the unions. Then, the unemployment rate, either measured by recipients of transfer payments or by these plus individuals being out of sample, is high, while we observe few transitions from receiving transfer payments to employment and a lot of transitions out of employment. Based on the friction hypothesis, we predict that an increase in jobto-job transitions or a reduction in transitions from employment to receiving transfer payments result in a smaller iqr. Correspondingly, the share of recipients of transfer payments or the share of recipients of transfer payments plus individuals being out of sample should decline. Since the search model gives a direct functional relationship for the variance and other parameters of the model, in addition we calculate the (tobit estimate of the) variance to estimate equation (9) directly.
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 20 education-by-age cells which are observed over 17 years. Using fixed-effects estimation techniques, we allow for cellspecific effects in wage dispersion, transition rates, and unemployment. It is quite likely that these cell-specific effects are both correlated with the dependent variable and the regressor variables, thus precluding estimating a random-effects model. Two reasons for endogeneity are particularly noteworthy since they may not be addressed completely by estimating a fixed-effects model. First, endogeneity problems arise from the very fact that each transition from and to employment affects the wage distribution depending upon the type of selectivity of the transition with respect to the position in the wage distribution. This is an issue when individuals in a cell are heterogeneous in their productivity (heterogeneity hypothesis). However, the sign of the empirical correlation between changes in transition rates and the wage dispersion measure should not differ from the sign of the causal effect because of the likely reaction of unions to changes in employment prospects.
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A second reason is that the two theories postulate a different direction of the relationship between transition rates and wage dispersion.
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In the following, we try to address this by using lagged regressors of the potentially endogenous explanatory variables. This means that, when estimating the impact of transition rates on wage dispersion, we use the rates from year t − 1 to year t to measure the impact on wage dispersion in year t and vice versa.
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A additional reason why the endogeneity, coming from the direct reverse causation of the theories, is not harmful to our approach is the following. Suppose that either the heterogeneity or the friction hypothesis holds. Suppose further that we empirically reject, for instance, the heterogeneity hypothesis. Then, rejection implies endogeneity as well as a rejection of the heterogeneity. Note that we can not err by accepting the heterogeneity hypothesis because endogeneity is consistent with the friction hypothesis. The latter implies a different direction of correlation. To illustrate this argument with an example: Assume that we regress the job destruction rate on iqr. The heterogeneity hypothesis predicts a negative sign. Suppose that according to the friction hypothesis the true sign is positive. Then, it is not possible to find a negative sign because of the endogeneity from the friction hypothesis, since this implies a positive correlation between iqr and jdr and therefore the bias would go into the opposite direction.
To circumvent problems stemming from the fact that both the transition rates and the wage dispersion measure have bounded support, we use positive monotone transfor-32 Take the following example: Consider a positive productivity shock, then employment prospects will improve and therefore transition rates into employment increase, it typically follows that wage dispersion increases, as a first order effect, for given union contract wages. In response, unions will raise contract wages effectively reducing wage dispersion. If unions trade off average wages and employment in their utility function, then both wage dispersion and transition rates into employment (and correspondingly the employment rate) are still higher in the end compared to the situation before the exogenous increase in transition rates. This follows from standard textbook models of wage bargaining.
33 Strictly speaking, the heterogeneity hypothesis focuses on λ and the friction hypothesis on λ L . However, they are likely to be strongly positively correlated.
34 Note, that the used lag structure -and therefore the adjustment pattern -is a crucial element of our identification strategy. This lag structure follows directly from the heterogeneity hypothesis, as argued above at the end of section 2.1. Admittedly, for the case of the friction hypothesis, the motivation for the lag structure is less obvious, see the discussion at the end of section 2.2. In light of the model, the friction parameters are exogenously given and determine wage dispersion. If there is a change in the friction parameters and if this change is exogenous in the sense that this change does not affect the wage dispersion directly but only via its effect on the friction parameters, then there is likely to be inertia in the adjustment of the wage setting behavior to find the new equilibrium wage distribution. Thus, a regression with wage dispersion as the left hand side variable and the (lagged) friction parameters as the right-hand-side variables can describe this delayed adjustment along the line of equilibrium search theory.
mations of these variables on the left hand side that are unbounded. That is, we use the transformation liqr = log(iqr) for the interquantile range, and the transformation tr = log(rate/(1 − rate)) for the transition rates.
Evidence for Heterogeneity Hypothesis
We estimate the model as a fixed-effects feasible GLS-model (FEGLS), see Wooldridge (2002, chapter 10.5.5) .
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Consider the following model estimated to test the heterogeneity hypothesis: ..., 20 and year t = 1980, ...., 1996 . iqr it is the interquantile range, tr it is the transformation log(rate it /(1 − rate it )), with rate it being the transition rate from t to t + 1, α the intercept, c i the unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed constant over time, and u it represents the unsystematic error component. In addition, equation (11) includes fixed year effects d t to control for business cycle effects.
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Estimation proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate equation (11) by fixed effects. We then calculate the empirical covariance matrix of the fixed effects residuals. After omitting one equation, since the covariance matrix of the fixed-effect-residuals does not have full rank (see Wooldridge (2002) , chapter 10.5.5), the remaining covariance matrix is used for the GLS transformation. Second, we estimate the transformed model. Table 2 shows the GLS estimates of equation (11) for different transition rates.
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The signs for different definitions of the job destruction rate (jdr1-jdr3) confirm in two out of three cases the heterogeneity hypothesis. It is significant, however, only for the broadest definition of entries into unemployment. From this it is not clear, whether an increasing wage dispersion indeed reduces transitions from employment to unemployment, as predicted by the heterogeneity hypothesis. The estimated coefficients for both definitions of the job finding rate (jf r1,jf r2) are significantly negative and contradict therefore the heterogeneity hypothesis. We expected that a higher wage dispersion would imply that the unemployed find jobs faster, since there are more jobs that fit the marginal productivity of the searching individuals. This seems not to be 35 We started with implementing both the standard fixed-effects estimator and the estimator in first differences. Typically, both variants seemed inefficient since the associated error terms after the fixedeffects and the first-differences transformation, respectively, still showed considerably autocorrelation and the precision of the estimates was quite low. The results for fixed effects and first differences are available upon request.
36 See Wilke (2004) for the importance of business cycle effects on transition rates in Germany. 37 Note that estimating equation (11) as a system of equations would not result in an efficiency gain, since we use the same regressors in all equations (Wooldridge (2002) , chapter 7.3). the case in Germany. The wage dispersion was not expected to have any effects on the job changing rate (jcr). The data, however, contradict this view as well. The higher the wage dispersion the higher is the job changing rate.
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Finally, we also explore directly the relationship between unemployment and wage dispersion in table 3, which is the focus of the heterogeneity hypothesis. For the narrow definition of unemployment (recipients of transfer payments only) u, we find a positive sign, but it is not significant. Also including the state out of sample (variablẽ u) increases slightly the size of the effect, however, it remains insignificant. For both definitions the sign contradicts the heterogeneity hypothesis since higher wage dispersion is associated with higher nonemployment (or with no change in unemployment at all). In light of our previous findings, this implies that the negative effect of the wage dispersion on the job finding rate dominates other effects that drive (equilibrium) unemployment. Thus, the heterogeneity hypothesis is rejected regarding this important relationship. Though not being significant, the positive coefficient estimates are in accordance with the friction hypothesis.
Evidence for Friction Hypothesis
Regarding the friction hypothesis we start by estimating equation (9) directly. We proceed as above, thus estimating a FEGLS-model under inclusion of year dummies and using a lag on the right-hand side. In addition we log-transform both sides of the equation, since this enables us to allow for a constant in the estimated equation; namely the log of the difference between marginal productivity and the lowest paid wage from the point of view of the theory. Thus, the estimated equation is
where i = 1, ..., 20, and t = 1981, ...., 1996. Recall that η = 
The Estimation is based on 320 observations. η refers to the frictions indicator. See the appendix for the exact definition of variables.
Next, we investigate whether the transition rates affect the (logarithm of the) interquantile range in the expected direction. Our estimated model is specified as ..., 20, and t = 1981, ...., 1996 . Again, fixed year effects are included to control for business cycle effects. The model is estimated by FEGLS. Table 5 contains the results for estimating equation (13) regressing the transformed interquantile range on the transition rates. The friction hypothesis purports that the job destruction rate (jdr1-jdr3) should have a positive influence on wage dispersion. This is supported by the data since we find positive signs which are always significant. Obviously, a higher job destruction rate is associated with higher wage dispersion, from the point of view of the friction hypothesis because higher job destruction increases the monopsony power of the firms via its effect on unemployment. The second prediction concerns the job offer rate, as measured either by the job-to-job transition rate (jor2) or by the wage position weighted rate (jor1). Here, an increase in the job offer rate should reduce wage dispersion. The signs found in the data are well in accordance with this hypothesis. However, we find a significantly negative effect only when controlling for transitions from employment to unemployment and for transitions from unemployment to employment and for the second definition (jor2). Obviously, if people change jobs more often wage dispersion decreases or remains unchanged. Finally, we suspected that the job finding rate (jf r1, jf r2) bears no influence on wage dispersion. This implication is not confirmed. Instead, we find a positive influence of the job finding rate on wage dispersion which always proves significant. When individuals find jobs faster, this seems to increase wage dispersion.
As a second evaluation of the friction hypothesis, we regress the (logarithm of the) wage dispersion measure on the lagged unemployment rate and on the lagged friction indicator, as defined in Van den Berg and Ridder (1993) , i.e. η = jdr jdr+jcr . Various regressions were run using different definitions of jdr and u, respectively. Table 6 indicates that the coefficient of η does not show the expected sign. The friction hypothesis predicts that wage dispersion rises with stronger market frictions η. Empirically, however, a higher value for η is associated with a lower interquantile range. This must be interpreted as evidence against search theory. Especially, in light of the previous estimation results this is astonishing, since we find that both factors influencing η, that is, jdr and jcr show the correct sign from the point of view of the friction hypothesis. The results for the two definitions of unemployment are in favor of search theory. Summing up, we conclude that both the heterogeneity hypothesis and the friction hypothesis are only partly consistent with the data. Strictly speaking, both hypotheses are rejected. However, the friction hypothesis performs a bit better than the heterogeneity hypothesis. Regarding the starting point of our discussion, namely the relationship between wage dispersion and unemployment, our results favor search theory and contradict the Krugman hypothesis regarding residual wage dispersion.
Conclusions
This paper attempts to discriminate between different theories on the relationship between unemployment and residual wage dispersion. We develop two hypotheses which exhibit different empirical implications. One view, which we denote heterogeneity hypothesis, is that wages are determined entirely by marginal productivity so that residual wage dispersion corresponds to residual productivity dispersion. To account for the institutional setting in Germany, we allow labor unions to compress wages from below by imposing different minimum wages for different groups of worker. Differences in residual wage dispersion might stem from union influence differing in strength. Accordingly, unemployment results because the minimum wage is higher than the marginal productivity of the unemployed. The alternative view, which we denote the friction hypothesis, is based on search theory. It states that after having controlled for age and education, residual individual heterogeneity is not sufficiently strong to account for the considerable residual wage dispersion. Instead, the residual wage dispersion is determined by the amount of search frictions. If search frictions are high, we will observe a high wage dispersion because search frictions lead to monopsony power for the firms resulting in higher wage dispersion. Accordingly, unemployment is not caused by minimum wages set by labor unions, but is a result of search frictions. Our empirical analysis tests these opposing hypotheses. We obtain panel estimates that are based on the comovement in transition rates, unemployment, and wage dispersion within age-education cells. The results are more supportive for the friction hypothesis than for the heterogeneity hypothesis, although some implications of the former hypothesis are rejected as well. Especially, regarding the relationship between unemployment and residual wage dispersion, the friction hypothesis seems to perform better. Thus, regarding residual wage dispersion, our results contradict the Krugman hypothesis. A compression of the residual wage dispersion does not seem to be associated with an increase in unemployment. One should emphasize that this has no implication on the validity of the Krugman hypothesis regarding between wage dispersion.
There are a number of critical issues which should be mentioned to put this study into perspective. First, the two hypotheses are complementary in a broad sense. They become mutually exclusive in the sense that the heterogeneity hypothesis postulates 'observable' residual heterogeneity while the friction hypothesis does not, once productivity related heterogeneity is accounted for. Second, the data do not perfectly match the data requirements. For instance, it would be interesting to investigate whether our (imperfect) wage dispersion measure is correlated with the relative strength of the union membership in a cell. Descriptive evidence in Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005) suggests that a higher union density in fact reduces within wage dispersion. Third, at this level of analysis, we cannot use the primitive variables, which search theory is built upon, e.g. for the job offer rate we have to rely on different proxies. For the most part, our analysis operates at a descriptive level based on observable transition rates, combined with wage information. This has the advantage that it does not require the strong assumptions typically invoked to estimate structural models of search equilibrium.
Appendix: Definition of Variables used in Empirical Analysis
1. jdr refers to the job destruction rate and has three different versions:
jdr1 (E-BR) is the rate of persons that are employed (E) in one year and who receive benefits (BR) in the next year.
jdr2 (E-BR|OOS) is the rate of individuals who are employed in the first year and receive benefits or are out of sample (OOS, conditional on returning) in the following year.
jdr3 (E-NoE) includes in the second year also individuals that do not return to the labor market.
2. jf r refers to the job finding rate and has two different versions:
jf r1 (BR-E) is the rate of individuals that receive benefits in one year and who are employed in the next year.
jf r2 (BR|OOS-E) comprises both benefit recipients and individuals that are temporarily not in the dataset (i.e. conditional on returning) in the first year.
3. jor refers to the job offer rate and has two different versions:
jor1 is the weighted share of individuals that has changed jobs between two consecutive years, where the weight is given by the inverse of their individual probability of obtaining a job offer that exceeds the own wage. Concretely,
where JC i is a dummy variable for a job-to-job change, H t (w) be the estimated wage offer distribution function, w i,t is the wage before the job-to-job change, and N is the total number of employees.
jor2/jcr (E-EO) is the share of individuals that has changed jobs between two consecutive years (the job changing rate). 4. When rates are used as left hand side variable in regressions, they are transformed as follows tr = log(rate/(1 − rate)) to insure that the variable is unbounded.
5. The wage dispersion measure iqr is the difference between the log of the eighth decile and the second decile. For the purpose of the regression, on the left hand side, we take the log of the difference, i.e.
liqr = log(iqr),
to ensure that the variable is unbounded. To estimate the structural relationship equation (12), we use the tobit estimate of the variance instead and log-transform the equation for the purpose if estimation.
6. The unemployment rate u in the narrow definition is defined as
and, in the broad definition,ũ is given bỹ u = BR + OOS E + BR + OOS .
As a left hand side variable, we use the transformation u = log(u/ (1 − u) ).
The narrow definition of the frictions indicator is calculated as
while the broad definition is given bỹ
For robustness, we use the job changing rate as a proxy for the job offer rate, where again the narrow definition is
while the broad definition is given bỹ η jcr = jdr3 jdr3 + jcr .
